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Summary of the project and its objectives
The UK is in a critical juncture with regard to the process of negotiations to leave the European 
Union. Important discussions are taking place which will shape the future relation between 
Britain and the EU. The economic analyses published on the issue have, so far, largely failed to 
grasp the attention of the general public. Most of the discussions about Brexit have focused 
at a national level and there has been very little evidence-based discussion at a local level. 
This project aims at stimulating a reflexive participatory research process involving citizens, 
policy-makers, business people and civil-society representatives. It introduces an innovative 
methodology that contextualises quantitative data through expert interviews and the analysis 
of local sources. The reports and discussion panels organised within the framework of the 
project seek to increase our understanding about the impact of Brexit at a local level.
This report contributes to the broader research project co-ordinated 
by the Conflict and Civil Society Research Unit at the London School of 
Economics and Political Science (LSE).
Understanding Brexit impacts at a local level 
Ceredigion case study
This study focuses on the perceived impact of Brexit on British local authorities. Five local 
authority case studies have been selected: Mansfield, Pendle, Ceredigion, Southampton and 
Barnet. As the aim of the broader study is to understand the impact of Brexit at the local level, 
this report is informed chiefly by the qualitative interviews, while the interviews themselves were 
conditioned by the quantitative impact assessments (see Appendix on page 18) that rely on 
nation-wide economic data.
CEREDIGON
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Executive summary
Ceredigion is a rural county and a parliamentary 
constituency in Mid Wales governed by Plaid Cymru. It 
is a traditional centre of the Welsh culture and language, 
and over half of its population speaks Welsh.
While Wales backed Brexit overall by 53 to 47%, 
Ceredigion voted to remain by 54.6 to 45.4%. Research 
shows that Welsh speakers overwhelmingly voted to 
remain in the EU.
An exploration of the EU referendum in Ceredigion reveals 
an interesting interplay of spatial, economic and cultural 
drivers of the vote. It points to the impact of direct EU 
funding and participation in the knowledge economy on 
pro-EU attitudes, and it also raises questions about the 
future of Welsh identity after Brexit.
The levels of international immigration into the county 
are relatively low but the rates of internal migration 
are significant: since 2011, outflows of mainly young 
residents from Ceredigion have resulted in population 
decrease of 2.5%. Demographic change affects the 
county’s cultural landscape and fuels concerns over the 
future of the Welsh language.
Ceredigion’s economy is chiefly reliant on the public 
sector, including health and higher education, with a 
prominent role for Aberystwyth University, as well as 
agriculture, hospitality and tourism. 
Given that the county is sparsely populated and 
geographically remote, its key economic sectors are 
interdependent, and any sectoral downturn poses 
considerable risk to the whole local economy. 
Agriculture, which is the only primary sector of 
Ceredigion’s economy, faces a number of risks related to 
Brexit. They mainly stem from the likely loss or decrease 
of farm subsidies and from uncertainty over future 
regulatory and trade arrangements, particularly regarding 
lamb farming and exports.
Higher education accounts for 20% of Ceredigion’s 
economic output, and it is also heavily exposed to Brexit-
related risks. In particular, EU27 nationals comprise 
around 15% of students at Aberystwyth University, and 
they often rely on access to student funding to pay for 
their tuition. Access to such funding for EU27 students is 
a key concern, while eligibility for EU research funding is 
an additional concern for the sector in Ceredigion.
While Ceredigion is a Remain area, this report outlines 
the contours of a Brexit scenario that would allow the 
county to mitigate against the most severe risks brought 
about by leaving the EU. Continued membership of the 
single market and customs union, access to home fees 
and finance for EU27 students, the retention of subsidies 
for the agricultural sector and the matching of EU 
funding for Wales on a pound-for-pound basis – instead 
of using the Barnett formula under which Westminster 
allocates funding for devolved governments and which 
would generate a funding gap of £133 million per year 
in agriculture alone – are the cornerstones of such a 
settlement.
The impact of Brexit is mainly discussed with reference to 
agriculture, which is the only notable primary industry in 
Ceredigion, and higher education, which accounts for 20 
percent of the county’s economic output. The report also 
shows that economic and cultural impacts intersect in 
Ceredigion. This is likely compounded by the county’s remote 
and somewhat self-contained geographic characteristics.
Researching and debating the impact of Brexit in Ceredigion 
is particularly important for two reasons. Firstly, it shows that 
while Brexit is a geopolitical process, it also translates into 
daily life and can affect everyday economic, social and cultural 
landscapes of British towns and villages. Secondly, it shows 
that the external dimension of Brexit – that is, the withdrawal 
from, and the future relationship with, the EU – overshadows 
equally important internal dimensions of Brexit, such as 
Britain’s future governance and its economic policy. 
Ceredigion was amongst areas shortlisted for our research as 
a marginal parliamentary constituency. It was then selected as 
one of five case studies, alongside Barnet, Mansfield, Pendle 
and Southampton, due to the significance of agriculture and 
education to its local economy. The share of agriculture in 
its overall economic output (1.7%) was the highest amongst 
marginal constituencies identified across England and Wales, 
while the share of education (20%) was the third highest after 
Oxford and Cambridge. 
1 Miller V. (Ed.). 2016. Brexit. Impact across policy areas. UK Parliament: House of Commons Library. Available at: http://dera.ioe.ac.uk/27171/1/CBP-7213.pdf. 
2 Wellcome Trust. 2018. Building a strong future for European science: Brexit and beyond. Available at: https://wellcome.ac.uk/sites/default/files/building-strong-
future-european-science-brexit-beyond.pdf. 
Our research showed these impacts do not exactly overlap with 
concerns identified by literatures taking a sectoral, and thus a 
national, view.1 For example, the supply of agricultural labour is 
not a major concern in Ceredigion given its model of farming is 
land-intensive rather than labour-intensive, but it is a concern 
for food processing in the area. Further, while access to EU 
research funding receives much attention in the context of 
British universities and Brexit,2 the key concern for Aberystwyth 
University is to retain access to home fees and student finance 
for EU27 students, who play a pivotal part in the University’s 
recruitment strategy.
Introduction
This report presents an analysis of the impacts of Brexit on Ceredigion, a 
predominantly rural county in Mid Wales. Drawing on expert interviews with local 
policymakers and representatives of key industries, the report shows that Brexit 
presents a significant degree of risk to the county’s economy.
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Our research included a review of the growing body of 
academic literature on Brexit, as well as of press reports and 
grey literature on each of the areas selected for case studies, 
including Ceredigion. In the second phase, participants for 
expert interviews were identified given their knowledge of 
Ceredigion’s politics and economy, and were invited to take part 
in our research. Finally, in the third phase, the following experts 
were interviewed during a research visit to Ceredigion on 24-25 
May 2018 and are listed here in alphabetical order:
Professor John Grattan, Pro Vice-Chancellor for Student 
Experience and International, Aberystwyth University
Peter Howells, County Adviser for Ceredigion and 
Pembrokeshire, National Farmers’ Union Cymru
Elin Jones AM, Llywydd (Speaker), National Assembly for 
Wales, and Assembly Member for Ceredigion
Ben Lake MP, Member of Parliament for Ceredigion
Charlotte Priddy, Policy Officer, Farmers’ Union of Wales
Huw Rhys Thomas, Political Adviser, National Farmers’ 
Union Cymru
Alun Williams, Ceredigion Council and Cabinet Member
This report extensively draws on data, insights and views about 
the impacts of Brexit on Ceredigion provided by the above 
interview participants. 
The key limitation of research presented here was that, in order 
to generate sufficient focus and depth of insight, its scope was 
narrowed down to expert voices and the two most prominent 
sectors of Ceredigion’s economy. The research visit in May 
2018 opened up further lines of enquiry, which will be explored 
at the subsequent stages of the project to broaden its scope 
and include other economic sectors in the analysis, as well 
as to represent voices of lay residents from each side of the 
Brexit divide.
The first section of this report presents background 
information on Ceredigion and is organised around the 
county’s demography, politics and economy. The second 
section elaborates on its relationship with Europe and the 
Brexit vote through the intersection of economic and cultural 
factors, such as the role of higher education or the complex 
relationship between land and identity. It presents key drivers 
of the vote to leave and to remain, identified through the 
analysis of interview data. The third section elaborates on 
the risks associated with Brexit, and is organised around 
current and future challenges facing the rural and knowledge 
economies, the two pillars of the county’s welfare. Finally, the 
last section summarises key challenges and opportunities that 
Brexit presents for Ceredigion.
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This outflow is only partially offset by internal migrants arriving 
from England, and international migrants from the EU and 
further afield.3 As a result, Ceredigion’s population decreased 
in the last decade, as did the percentage of Welsh speakers. 
Politically the county has traditionally been a liberal and 
nationalist stronghold, and Plaid Cymru, or the Welsh nationalist 
party, marginally won Ceredigion’s sole seat in the House of 
Commons from the Liberal Democrats at the 2017 General 
Election. The county’s economy is sustained by the public sector 
and higher education – with a particularly prominent role for 
Aberystwyth University – as well as agriculture and hospitality. 
Given its remote and rural geography, there is a high level of 
economic interdependence between different economic sectors, 
which co-exist in a fine balance.  
Population
The economic heart and administrative centre of Ceredigion 
is in Aberystwyth, a coastal town that relies on the public 
sector and higher education for its prosperity. At the time of 
the 2011 Census, Aberystwyth had 13,040 residents,4 but the 
town’s population swells by half with the arrival of Aberystwyth 
University students during term time.5 Ceredigion’s second 
administrative centre is Aberaeron, where the County Council 
is headquartered, but this town is much smaller with just 1,422 
residents.6 Two other economic centres are Lampeter, located 
inland and hosting the other of the county’s two universities, 
and Cardigan, where the local economy largely relies on retail, 
education and health services.
3 Interviews with Alun Williams, 24 May 2018; Elin Jones AM, 25 May 2018; and Ben Lake MP, 5 June 2018.
4 Aberystwyth and Ceredigion Population Data. 2011. Available at: https://www.aberystwyth.org.uk/more/statistics.shtml.
5 In 2016-2017 the University had 8,455 students, including 6,670 full-time, and the vast majority of those resides in the town. HESA. Data on HE student enrolments by 
HE provider 2016/17. Available at: https://www.hesa.ac.uk/data-and-analysis/students/table-1.
6 Office for National Statistics (ONS). Local Statistics. Available at: https://www.ons.gov.uk/help/localstatistics. 
7 Ceredigion population data rely on the ONS Estimates for mid-2016, the most recent dataset available. Available at: https://www.ons.gov.uk/
peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationestimates/datasets/populationestimatesforukenglandandwalesscotlandandnorthernireland.
8 ONS Population Estimates. 2016. Available at: https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/bulletins/
ukpopulationbycountryofbirthandnationality/2016. 
9 Interviews with Alun Williams, 24 May 2018; and Elin Jones AM, 25 May 2018. See also National Conversation. 2018. Aberystwyth: Welcoming newcomers and 
preserving local culture. 9 March. Available at: http://nationalconversation.uk/aberystwyth-welcoming-newcomers-and-preserving-local-culture/.
Overall, Ceredigion has 74,146 inhabitants.7 The county 
ranks nineteenth amongst 22 principal areas of Wales by the 
size of population, and it has the second-lowest population 
density. It does not generally face significant demographic 
pressures from international migration: as of 2016, just 6.7% of 
Ceredigion’s population was born abroad, compared to the UK 
average of 14.1%, and live births to non-UK-born mothers were 
also relatively low at 11.1%, compared to the UK average of 
26.9%. The only aspect of international migration in Ceredigion 
which is higher than the British average is the number of 
short-term international migrants with 4 persons per 1,000 
population – as opposed to 3 per 1,000 for the UK overall.8 92% 
of the county’s residents are white and were born in the United 
Kingdom, and nearly half speaks Welsh.
However, there is widespread concern about the future 
status of Ceredigion as the centre of Welsh heritage. Net 
inflow of international migrants at around 350 per year is 
coupled with an internal migration outflow of over 650, which 
is predominantly caused by young people moving to urban 
centres of England and Wales to pursue career opportunities 
that are not available locally. The actual scale of this outflow is 
somewhat concealed by an internal inflow of chiefly middle-
aged and elderly migrants from England. Nonetheless, in the 
last decade, Ceredigion lost a number of Welsh speakers living 
there and a significant proportion of its inhabitants: the county’s 
population is estimated to have decreased by almost 2,000, 
or 2.5%, since 2011. Those who move in, either from England, 
Europe or further afield, are generally unlikely to learn Welsh.9
Background on Ceredigion
Ceredigion traditionally has been an important centre of the Welsh culture 
and language. Over half of its population speaks Welsh, but this sociocultural 
landscape is changing as young people move away from the county. 
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Politics
The 42-strong County Council is dominated by Plaid Cymru, 
which holds 20 seats, while independent councillors are the 
second-largest group with eleven. Welsh Liberal Democrats 
have eight seats, and the Labour Party has one councillor 
who is part of the Independent Voice group alongside two 
independent councillors. The Conservatives do not have a 
single councillor in Ceredigion. Aberporth – a large coastal 
village in the southern part of the county – had a UKIP 
councillor in 2014 but the party lost the seat to Plaid Cymru at 
the last election.10
Between 2005 and 2017, the Liberal Democrats represented 
Ceredigion in the House of Commons, but at the last election 
they lost the seat to Ben Lake of Plaid Cymru. Lake, a 25-year-
old Lampeter native and Oxford graduate, and the youngest 
MP in Wales, says he achieved his knife-edge majority of 104 
votes11 mainly due to erosion of the Lib-Dem support as the 
adverse effects of austerity on the one hand, and of the rise 
in university tuition fees on the other, became increasingly 
felt in the county. He also points to the ‘presidential nature’ 
of the 2017 election.12 In a polarised political landscape, the 
Conservatives and Labour gained substantially, while UKIP and 
10 BBC. 2014. Plaid issues ultimatum over UKIP councillor. 11 March. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-politics-26528571.
11 BBC. 2017. Ceredigion parliamentary constituency election results 2017. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics/constituencies/W07000064.
12 Interview with Ben Lake MP, 5 June 201
13 Hughes O. 2015. Yogurt firm Rachel’s Organic to axe staff after Tesco blow. Daily Post. 23 April. Available at: https://www.dailypost.co.uk/business/business-news/
yogurt-firm-rachels-organic-axe-9099872.
14 Aberystwyth University. 2018. About Aberystwyth. Available at: https://www.aber.ac.uk/en/staff-induction/community/.
the Greens collapsed, and so the 1.6% increase in Plaid Cymru 
support translated into a win. Lake believes the seat will be 
hotly contested at the next election.
Economy
Economically, Ceredigion is reliant on public funding as well 
as the knowledge and rural economies. Education, health, 
hospitality and retail are the largest sectors and account for 
over 56% of the county’s economic output. However, this does 
not necessarily overlap with the proportion of workforce in each 
sector. For example, education alone accounts for 20% of the 
economy, but only around 5,000 residents are employed in this 
sector directly. 
Aberystwyth’s major employers include the University, Bronglais 
Hospital, and the National Library of Wales. The dairy products 
company Rachel’s Organic is the largest private firm in town. 
It has both headquarters and manufacturing facilities there 
but it was reported to employ just 92 people in 2015.13 In 
comparison, the University’s workforce currently stands at 
around 2,000.14 Other private sector employment is scattered 
across numerous small businesses that mostly operate in retail 
and hospitality.
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Figure 1: Employment in key areas, Ceredigion, 1984 to 2015
Employment share is shown for industries most exposed to Brexit impacts
 Accommodation/Food
 Health/Social Work
 Education
 Professional
 Finance/Insurance
 Manufacturing
 Agriculture & Forestry
Source: UK Business Register and 
Employment Survey (BRES).
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Agriculture only accounts for 1.7% of the economic output, but 
its significance is much greater because of the ‘multiplier’ effect: 
every £1 generated in agriculture translates into £7.40 for the 
local economy through supply chains and spending.15 Further, 
it employs almost 3,000 people and plays a huge role in the 
local economy through ‘upstream and downstream’  economic 
effects.16 This means that farming is the primary industry that 
generates wealth and provides jobs through its supply chain and 
food processing across rural and remote parts of Ceredigion, 
away from its main towns. Local shops, surgeries and schools 
on the one hand, and meat and dairy processing facilities on 
the other, can only run for as long as there are enough people 
working in agriculture to sustain them.17 In addition, farmers 
steward the bucolic landscape and thus help attract tourists and 
students into the county. As Peter Howells from the National 
Farmers Union Wales puts it, in Ceredigion ‘agriculture and 
tourism exist in a symbiotic relationship’.18
15 Data complied by the National Farmers’ Union Wales (NFU) and the Farmers’ Union Wales (FUW).
16 Interview with Huw Rhys Thomas, Political Advisor, NFU, and Peter Howells, Ceredigion and Pembrokeshire County Advisor, NFU, 24 May 2018.
17 Ibid.
18 Interview with Peter Howells, 24 May 2018.
Ceredigion is an economy in a fine balance, and its sectors 
depend on one another. This is at least partly caused by the 
county’s remoteness from other economic centres. There is 
no direct rail or motorway link to either Cardiff or London. It 
takes 2.5 hours to get from Aberystwyth to the Welsh capital 
by car, and to get there by rail one has to first travel to the 
English town of Shrewsbury. From London, it is a five-hour 
drive and there is just one road to get to Aberystwyth, the A44. 
But while the county is somewhat isolated from other parts 
of Wales and Britain, it is also very open to newcomers – 
especially from overseas.
Image 3: Welsh farmers proud to produce
‘In Ceredigion, agriculture and tourism 
exist in a symbiotic relationship’
Peter Howells, National Farmers Union Cymru 
Analysis of the Remain vote can not only shed light on key 
factors that swung the vote in the county, but also points to 
some broader concerns which animate Remain sentiment and, 
ultimately, have to be addressed to achieve a Brexit settlement 
that enjoys wide public support. 
While the Welsh voters overall backed Brexit by roughly 53 
to 47%, Ceredigion was one of just five areas in Wales – out 
of 22 in total – to vote against it by 54.6 to 45.4%.19 The split 
between the vote to leave and to remain in the county points 
to several challenges which emerge in relation to Brexit. They 
have implications for the local economy and the county’s 
politics more broadly. In particular, the uneven distribution of 
the knowledge economy across the county appears to translate 
into political outcomes, and a degree of anxiety over the future 
of Welshness also has political implications. This section 
analyses these concerns in tandem, taking the Brexit vote as a 
starting point.
In 2016, a YouGov poll found Aberystwyth and Aberaeron to 
be the two most pro-EU towns of 188 places surveyed across 
the UK.20 This was broadly reflected in the results of the 2016 
referendum. Ceredigion decisively voted to remain, but this vote 
was the highest in the north of the county and particularly in 
Aberystwyth where, in the wards adjacent to the University, it 
reached well over 70%.
A spatial analysis by Alun Williams, a county councillor and 
cabinet member from the nationalist party Plaid Cymru, 
shows that only in the southern parts of Ceredigion did the 
vote to leave slightly outweigh the Remain vote21. Interestingly, 
these parts of the county are distant from its universities 
and centres of the Welsh culture, while being popular with 
internal migrants from England. Overall, the proximity of 
higher education institutions and the high level of education 
19 James D. and Pritchard H. 2016. The full EU referendum results map for every area in Wales. Wales Online. 24 June. Available at: https://www.walesonline.co.uk/
news/politics/full-eu-referendum-results-map-11510374.
20 Lusher A. 2016. Aberystwyth: Welcome to the most Europhile place in Britain. The Independent. 5 March. Available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-
news/aberystwyth-welcome-to-the-most-europhile-place-in-britain-a6913001.html.
21 Williams A. 2016. Aberystwyth and Ceredigion’s vote to Remain. 4 July. Available at: http://bronglais.blogspot.com/2016/07/aberystwyth-and-ceredigions-vote-to.html.
22 Interview with John Grattan, Pro Vice-Chancellor for Student Experience and International, Aberystwyth University, 25 May 2018.
23 Interview with Alun Williams, 24 May 2018.
of the local population appeared to be strong predictors of 
the pro-EU vote in the county. Economic and cultural drivers 
intersect in these spatial dynamics, given that universities have 
a significant impact on both the local economy and cultural 
landscape – as John Grattan, Pro Vice-Chancellor for Student 
Experience and International, Aberystwyth University, pointed 
out, Aberystwyth University is the country’s main centre of 
academic learning and instruction in the Welsh language, 
and only Bangor University in North Wales has comparable 
capacity and impact.22 Williams also pointed out that, looking 
from Aberystwyth, London does not seem much more remote 
than Cardiff. Further, he observed that many see the EU as 
the more generous authority compared with the two more 
geographically proximate governments when it comes to 
funding for the county.23
This last point ties in with a number of economic factors 
identified through this research, which likely played into pro-
EU attitudes in Ceredigion. Wales has traditionally received 
significant agricultural and structural funding from the EU in 
general, but this seems to have translated in much stronger 
Remain sentiment in Ceredigion 
compared to other areas, for 
example Brexit-supporting South 
Wales. Some of the experts 
interviewed for this report 
emphasised the fact that EU 
funding for the county is rather 
dispersed. Instead of being 
allocated predominantly to large 
infrastructure projects, as is the 
case in South Wales, a significant 
proportion of the funding in 
Ceredigion is funnelled directly 
Explaining the Brexit vote in Ceredigion
In debates about Brexit much attention is focused on the voters who backed 
‘Leave’, and the drivers of that vote. This renders the vote to remain a residual 
and under-researched category, and yet Ceredigion offers interesting insights. 
of fluent welsh speakers 
don’t identify as British 
voted to leave the EU
16%
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 Image 4: Aberystwyth waterfront
to individuals. For example, farmers receive direct payments 
under the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), and so ‘they 
know where the money is coming from’.24 Under the first pillar 
of the CAP, farmers receive direct subsidies dependent on the 
size of their land. In addition, they benefit from the second pillar 
of CAP that supports initiatives seeking to address economic, 
environmental and societal challenges in rural communities.
Structural funding from the EU, albeit more often spent 
on infrastructure projects, in some cases also directly 
benefited individuals in Ceredigion. For example, 2,265 of the 
county’s residents took part in the 2007-2013 programme 
of apprenticeships financed from the European Social Fund. 
In the same period, the flood and coastal risk management 
programmes benefitted 765 households across the county. 
Finally, the Aberystwyth Innovation and Enterprise Campus 
received a £20 million investment from the EU.25 Existing 
24 Interview with Huw Rhys Thomas, 24 May 2018.
25 Llywodraeth Cymru Welsh Government. 2017. EU funds in Wales. Available at: http://gov.wales/funding/eu-funds/?lang=en.
26 Hooghe L. and Marks G. 2005. Calculation, community and cues: Public opinion on European integration. European Union Politics, 6(4), pp. 419–443.
27 Dellmuth L.M. and Chalmers A.W. 2017. All spending is not equal: European Union public spending, policy feedback and citizens’ support for the EU. European Journal 
of Policy Research, 57, pp. 3–23, 18.
28 Ibid.
literature on public spending and political support indicates 
fiscal transfers can encourage support for the EU in general,26 
but more granular analyses are rare. This blind spot extends 
over regional and sub-regional impacts of public funding and its 
allocation. Thus, existing literature is largely unable to explain 
variation in support for the EU at local level between places 
receiving a substantial share of its funding, as it is the case 
in Mid and South Wales. However, Lisa Dellmuth and Adam 
Chalmers recently drew on policy feedback theories to show 
that ‘the fit between targeted transfers and economic need 
is an important determinant of support’ for the EU.27  Their 
analysis indicates that ‘we can only understand the effects of 
spending on support for the EU when examining how transfers 
are spent’28, and that positive correlation is strong in those 
cases, where this funding is appropriate for the local economic 
context. In addition, recent research also found that the support 
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for the EU from regional parties depends on the level of EU 
funding their region receives,29 and this holds true in case of the 
staunchly pro-European Plaid Cymru.
The above analyses of the role of EU funding in generating 
pro-EU attitudes fit in well with findings presented in this report, 
where experts generally concurred that the way EU funding 
was spent in Ceredigion positively impacted on pro-Remain 
attitudes. Some of the experts observed that the allocation 
of EU funding is inevitably unequal. To some in the county, 
especially in its southern parts which get a lower share of EU 
funding, the economic benefits of EU membership may not 
be all that clear, and that could tie in with higher levels of the 
vote to leave. However, as Elin Jones AM pointed out, uneven 
distribution of infrastructure funding is inevitable and thus a 
degree of grievance is to be expected.30
Instead, Jones emphasised the role of cultural factors and 
observed that leave prevailed mainly in areas where internal 
migrants from England settle.31 Like Alun Williams, she 
primarily linked the vote distribution with the level of education, 
29 Gross M. and Debus M. 2018. Does EU regional policy increase parties’ support for European integration? West European Politics, 41 (3), pp. 594-614.
30 Interview with Elin Jones AM, 25 May 2018.
31 Ibid.
32 Curtice J. 2017. Why Leave won the UK’s EU referendum. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 55, pp. 19-37; Hobolt S. B.  2016. The Brexit vote: a divided nation, 
a divided continent. Journal of European Public Policy, 23 (9), pp. 1259-1277; and Menon A. (Ed.). 2017. Brexit and public opinion. UK in a changing Europe report. 
Available at: http://ukandeu.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Public-Opinion.pdf.
33 Virdee S. and McGeever S. 2017. Racism, crisis, Brexit. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 41 (10), pp. 1802-1819. See also Hayton R. 2016. The UK Independence Party and the 
politics of Englishness. Political Studies Review, 14(3), pp. 400–410.
34 Richards L. and Heath A. 2017. Sovereignty and cooperation: different dimensions of Brexit. In: Menon 2017. Available at: http://ukandeu.ac.uk/wp-content/
uploads/2018/01/Public-Opinion.pdf.
which is lower in the southern parts of the county, and the 
proximity to universities. However, she also added that during 
the 2015 election and the 2016 referendum campaigns, 
migration and race relations for the first time emerged as 
doorstep issues, and that she witnessed xenophobic or racist 
remarks when canvassing across the county. In her view, this 
was linked with an increase in anti-migrant discourses in the 
national media and much of the tabloid press in particular. 
Recent academic research also emphasises the role of 
cultural drivers in the Brexit vote.32 However, such analyses 
usually focus on how the politicisation of nationality – and 
of Englishness specifically –33 pitted against transnational 
British and European identities precipitated the vote to leave.34 
Ceredigion, on the other hand, shows how a strong sense of 
Welshness was associated, though not uniformly, with the vote 
to remain.
Much of Ceredigion’s population are Welsh speakers and 
many identify as Welsh but not British. It appears this played 
an important part in securing a win for Remain in the county. 
 Image 5: Llangynfelyn, St Cynfelyn’s Church, Ceredigion
Professor Richard Wyn Jones (Cardiff University), who 
analysed British Election Survey data, confirmed that there 
was a strong correlation between pro-EU attitudes and Welsh 
national identity. Across Wales, just ‘29 percent of those 
who feel strongly Welsh but not strongly British voted leave, 
compared to 58 percent of those who feel both strongly Welsh 
and strongly British.’35 Most strikingly, only 16% of those who 
are fluent in Welsh, and do not identify as British, voted to leave. 
This points to an interesting overlap between national identity 
and Remain sentiment which, if not accommodated within the 
Brexit settlement, may generate further tensions in Ceredigion 
and Wales.
Welsh nationalists from Plaid Cymru, who currently 
control Ceredigion’s council, cabinet and the county’s sole 
parliamentary seat, do not see the EU as a threat to their 
identity. On the contrary, they often see it as its custodian. 
Interviews with elected officials – who were all from Plaid 
Cymru, given the county’s political landscape today – showed 
much cultural anxiety related to Brexit. Several experts pointed 
out that the EU generally protects minority rights,36 a view 
that is supported by wider evidence on the Europeanisation of 
minority rights protection and the regionalisation of politics in 
EU member states.37 When discussing this, some mentioned 
one striking feature of Aberystwyth’s waterfront: namely, the 
unusual choice of flags that the town selected to line its scenic 
promenade. These are the flags of ‘twenty European stateless 
nations and peoples’,38 such the Basque Country, Brittany, 
Catalonia, Cornwall, Kashubia, Sápmi, Sardinia and Scotland, as 
well as the stateless and landless nation of the Romani people.
35 Wyn Jones R. 2018. Holyhead will be one of the biggest losers from Brexit. Irish Times. 4 January. Available at: https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/
holyhead-will-be-one-of-the-biggest-losers-from-brexit-1.3343977.
36 Interviews with Alun Williams, 24 May 2018; Elin Jones AM, 25 May 2018; and Ben Lake MP, 5 June 2018.
37 Memisoglu F. 2007. The European Union’s minority rights policy and its impact on the development of minority rights protection in Greece. 14-15 June. Available at: 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/pdf/3rd_Symposium/PAPERS/MEMISOGLOU_FULYA.pdf. 
38 Williams A. 2015. Renewal of Aberystwyth’s small nation flags. 7 June. Available at: http://bronglais.blogspot.com/2015/06/a-renewal-of-aberystwyths-small-
nation.html.
39 This sign is shown in Image 1.
When driving towards Aberystwyth on A44, the road which 
links it with the south of England, drivers are welcomed by a 
road sign. Someone put a small sticker on it, and on closer 
look, the sign now reads ‘European Republic of Ceredigion’.39 
However, the county may not be part of the bloc for much 
longer. The UK is scheduled to leave in March 2019 and, in 
this sense, Brexit means Brexit. But what does Brexit mean 
specifically for Ceredigion?
An exploration of the reasons and implications of the Brexit 
vote in Ceredigion reveals an interesting interplay of spatial, 
economic and cultural drivers of the vote. It points to the 
impact of direct EU funding and participation in the knowledge 
economy on the sense of Europeanness on the one hand, 
and on the other it raises questions about the future of the 
Welsh language, culture and identity – and Welsh nationalism 
– after Brexit. It also signals the need to consider these 
implications when planning a Brexit that meets the needs of 
local economies, and protects the rights of minorities that often 
depend on them.
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Interviews with experts consulted for this project showed 
that Brexit would impact all these sectors. However, given 
the constraints of this report, the following section will focus 
on two sectors, agriculture and higher education, to provide 
insights into the local impacts of Brexit. 
Analyses of the sectoral impacts of Brexit show that EU farm 
subsidies currently make up between 50 and 60 percent of UK 
farm income. Initially, the British government guaranteed the 
current level of direct subsidies until 2020,40 and subsequently 
it extended this guarantee ‘until the end of the Parliament, 
under the expectation that this will be 2022’.41 It is, however, not 
clear what levels of support the British government will provide 
beyond 2022 and how this support will be allocated. Therefore, 
the main risk for agriculture is associated with uncertainty over 
direct subsidies, while other sectoral risks include uncertainty 
over trade and regulatory requirements, availability of plant 
protection products and access to labour.
With regards to higher education, ‘arguably the most significant 
consequences of EU membership for the UK higher education 
sector are the provision of support to EU students studying in 
the UK and access to European research funding.’42 After Brexit, 
the British government will not have to provide student loans 
or maintenance funding for EU27 students, and could possibly 
charge tuition fees at overseas, rather than home, rates.43 The 
UK may also lose access to EU research funding, and there 
are concerns that the recruitment of academic staff could be 
impacted as well, which would detrimentally affect the quality 
of research and teaching. 
40 Grant W. 2016. The challenges facing UK farmers from Brexit. EuroChoices, 15(2), pp. 11-16; Miller 2016; and  Swinbank A. 2017 World trade rules and the policy 
options for British agriculture post-Brexit. UK Trade Policy Observatory Briefing Paper 7. Available at: http://blogs.sussex.ac.uk/uktpo/files/2017/01/Briefing-paper-7.
pdf. 
41 Downing, E. and Coe, S. 2018. Brexit: Future UK agriculture policy. House of Commons Library Briefing Paper 8218. 31 January 2018. Available at: https://www.
parliament.uk/documents/commons-library/Brexit-UK-agriculture-policy-CBP-8218.pdf.
42 Miller 2016. 
43 Conlon G., Ladher R. and Halterbeck R. 2018. The determinants of international demand for UK higher education. Higher Education Policy Institute Report 91. 
Available at: http://www.hepi.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Hepi-Report-91-Screen.pdf.
44 Interview with Charlotte Priddy, 25 May 2018.
45 Interview with Huw Rhys Thomas, 24 May 2018.
In general, these risks are also present in Ceredigion. In 
agriculture, the salience of risks associated with access to 
labour is relatively less significant than nationally, given that 
farming in the county is not as reliant on seasonal labour as it 
is in some other parts of the UK. As regards higher education, 
Aberystwyth University is heavily exposed to Brexit as well, and 
continued recruitment of EU27 students in particular emerges 
as a serious concern that threatens its future status. These 
and further impacts are discussed in detail in the two sections 
that follow.
Agriculture
The risk of Brexit mobilised both farmers’ unions operating in 
Wales to endorse the Remain side. Following consultations 
with their members, the Farmers’ Union of Wales (FUW), which 
largely represents smaller, family farms and operates only in 
Wales, and the National Farmers’ Union Wales (NFU), which is 
part of the largest industry association for farmers in England 
and Wales, both took the view that continuing EU membership 
is in the interests of Welsh farmers.44 The NFU’s governing 
body voted fairly strongly in favour of a Remain position on 
11 March 2016, although the union refrained from active 
campaigning. As its Political Adviser Huw Rhys Thomas recalls, 
‘it was a show of hands really, we didn’t need to go to a count 
or anything; it was quite clear from the show of hands.’45 This 
is somewhat surprising, given nationwide reports that farmers 
predominantly backed leaving the EU, but Peter Howells – also 
of the NFU – disputes this, and says it is not consistent with 
his experience of regular conversations about the issue with 
farmers in Ceredigion. Charlotte Priddy of the FUW, on the other 
hand, says her union worked hard to convince its members to 
Brexit effects
Ceredigion’s economy largely relies on the public sector, higher education, 
agriculture and hospitality to generate the county’s wealth.
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back Remain. FUW organised workshops in the run-up to the 
vote to discuss key issues, and debates were rather vigorous. 
While Priddy never asked for participants’ position on Brexit to 
ensure the debates were on merits rather than voting choices, 
her assessment is that FUW members were evenly split in the 
referendum.
Grievances of farmers voting to leave were mainly around 
‘the red tape’, and particularly the electronic tagging of sheep, 
which indeed stems from EU regulations.46 Price volatility of 
agricultural products was also a frequent concern amongst 
farmers and, while not related to the EU membership, it seems 
to have compounded frustration with the agricultural policy and 
bolstered the vote to leave.47
Agriculture experts interviewed for this report acknowledge 
these concerns, and some agree that the electronic tagging of 
sheep is an excessive requirement in the context of Mid-Wales 
farming. They also point out that the most significant Brexit 
impact to date has been in fact positive as CAP payments 
and lamb exports increased in value, given that the euro had 
appreciated in relation to the pound following the Brexit vote. 
However, they are quick to point out that this advantage is 
neither sustainable nor sufficient to offset future cuts or 
outright loss of farm subsidies and export markets. Finally, 
experts concur that new trade arrangements, if very favourable, 
might lead to improved access to Chinese and Middle Eastern 
markets for Welsh farmers. 
While experts interviewed for this report agree that the benefits 
of Brexit are largely coincidental or uncertain, they also point 
out the following risks, which in their assessment will turn into 
negative impacts once the UK leaves the EU:
• CAP payments are made directly to farmers under the first 
pillar, while the second pillar is comprised of payments for 
specific rural development and environmental projects. The 
Welsh Government proposed to replace these subsidies 
after Brexit with a new Land Management Programme, 
which consists of the Economic Resilience scheme and the 
Public Goods scheme.48 While these schemes may offset 
the loss of payments currently received under the second 
pillar of CAP, there have been no proposals to compensate 
for the loss of direct subsidies after Brexit. If this is the case, 
there is a clear risk that this new funding will disadvantage 
smaller and less dynamic farms.49
46 Interview with Charlotte Priddy, 25 May 2018.
47 Interview with Ben Lake MP, 5 June 2018.
48 Welsh Government. 2018. Brexit and our land: Securing the future of Welsh farming. Consultation responses by 30 October 2018. Available at: https://beta.gov.wales/
sites/default/files/consultations/2018-07/brexit-and-our-land-consultation-document_1.pdf.
49 Interview with Charlotte Priddy, 25 May 2018, and email communication with Huw Rhys Thomas, 31 August 2018.
50 FUW information sheet for the Fair Farm Funding campaign, no date.
51 FUW. 2018. Devil will be in the detail - FUW response to EU Withdrawal Bill agreement. 26 April. Available at: https://www.fuw.org.uk/news/13094-devil-will-be-in-
the-detail-fuw-response-to-eu-withdrawal-bill-agreement.
52 Interview with Elin Jones AM, 25 May 2018.
53 Interview with Huw Rhys Thomas, 24 May 2018.
• Further, CAP payments are calculated under a different 
formula than that used to allocate funding for devolved 
authorities in general. The CAP formula is based on 
agricultural criteria and, as a result, 9.4% of all UK funding 
for farms is allocated to Wales. Data analysed by the FUW 
shows that Wales receives just 5.6% of all UK funding 
under the Barnett formula, which is used by HM Treasury to 
allocate devolved budgets and is based on population and 
development criteria. This would translate into a gap of £133 
million per year for agricultural subsidies.50 The new funding 
formula was singled out as the key issue in the FUW’s 
response to the EU Withdrawal Bill agreement between 
the British and Welsh governments in May 201851 and is 
also highlighted by the NFU. Of note, this agreement was 
supported in the Welsh Assembly by the ruling Welsh Labour 
party but opposed by Plaid Cymru, which coordinates on the 
Withdrawal Bill with the Scottish National Party, and they are 
both against the bill in its current form.52
• Post-Brexit agricultural regulations may be heavier, not 
lighter, and in particular experts consulted for this report 
identified the risk of a chaotic transition period where the 
farmers may struggle to adopt to new regulations. This is 
compounded by uncertainty over future agricultural and 
trade policy, and while farmers’ unions seem to enjoy an 
improved access to ministers and are consulted more since 
the EU referendum, this fails to translate into more certainty 
over future policy direction, given the government is yet to 
clarify its own position.53 
• Experts concur that while new trade deals with China 
and countries in the Middle East may provide export 
opportunities if signed very soon, trade deals with the US 
and Australia threaten to undercut Welsh farmers on price. 
The US exports are cheaper and Welsh farmers currently 
enjoy an advantage on the quality of their produce, with US 
exports blocked by EU food standards regulations. This may 
not be the case after Brexit. Furthermore, 83% of Welsh food 
and live animal exports go to the EU and 35-40% of all lamb 
is exported, almost entirely to EU countries. After Brexit, 
farmers will have to find new markets for their produce 
where competition is on price rather than quality.
• The value of the land may become volatile, which would affect 
the farmers’ ability to borrow money for investment – although 
there is no evidence of it dropping in value at the moment.
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• Finally, recruitment of a migrant workforce is not as much 
of a problem for farms in Ceredigion and Wales in general, 
as they are sheep, cattle and dairy farms and as such 
do not rely on seasonal workers as heavily as farms in 
much of England, especially orchards. However, there are 
significant risks to the upstream operations, given that 
63 percent of workers in red and white meat processing 
plants are from EU27 countries, and 85% of vets there are 
from outside the UK.54
This last aspect is actually visible in Ceredigion. The county’s 
largest meat processing plant, located in Llanybydder near 
Lampeter and owned by the Irish firm Dunbia, is said to rely 
predominantly on Polish and Romanian workers. The town has 
few shops, and one of them is the Polish deli Majka,55 which 
displays an ‘Everyone Welcome’ sign in its shop window. A 
smaller sign adds ‘Produse Romanesti’ (Romanian products 
54 NFU. July 2017. Vision for the future of farming: Access to a competent and flexible workforce. Available at: https://www.nfuonline.com/nfu-online/news/nfu-
reports/access-to-a-competent-and-flexible-workforce/.
55 Shown in Photo 4.
available here). The deli was closed for the evening during 
the research visit, but the only shop that was open – a small 
chain supermarket – has a vast selection of Eastern European 
confectionery, cheese and meats, seemingly odd stock for a 
small town in Mid Wales.
‘Land has quite a significant cultural 
value for Wales. Farmers look after the 
landscape, and it’s integral to the image 
of Wales… And the Welsh language 
and culture aspect is very strong in the 
farming community as well.’
Huw Rhys Thomas, National Farmers Union Cymru
Image 6: Majka, the Polish deli in Llanybydder
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This leads to the final point about Ceredigion’s agriculture. 
While it accounts for a relatively small percentage of the 
county’s economic output, its significance is much greater 
because of the ‘multiplier’ mentioned across all interviews: 
every £1 generated in agriculture translates into £7.40 for the 
local economy through supply chains and spending.56 Further, 
each job in farming generates 3.5 jobs in retail, wholesale, 
catering and manufacturing.57 This figure does not include 
jobs in public services, whose delivery is only feasible because 
of farmers, and tourism, which relies on Ceredigion’s rural 
landscape to attract visitors. Often, the link between agriculture 
and tourism is more direct, with the husband looking after the 
farm and the wife running a bed and breakfast or business, as 
Charlotte Priddy puts it58.
A 2014 survey of 659 farms in Ceredigion, carried out by the 
FUW, put the farms’ aggregate turnover at €144 million and 
their workforce at 3,200 people. While the county has just 
below 75,000 people, it has 100,000 cattle and 885,000 sheep, 
according to the survey.59 Farming is a hugely important part 
of the county’s life, not just in financial terms. As Huw Rhys 
Thomas puts it, land has ‘quite a significant cultural value for 
Wales. Farmers look after the landscape, and it’s fairly integral 
to the image that people from outside have of Wales… And the 
Welsh language and culture aspect is very strong in the farming 
community as well.’ 60
Education
If agriculture is the economic sector that underpins Ceredigion’s 
regional and national identity, then higher education is the key 
contributor to its economic welfare. Aberystwyth University has 
generated jobs and wealth in the county since it was funded 
as the University College of Wales in 1872, and Lampeter was 
home to the oldest university in Wales, founded in 1822 and 
given a royal charter in 1828. Given that in 2010 the latter 
merged with Trinity University College to form the University 
of Wales Trinity Saint David, with campuses in Lampeter, 
Carmarthen and Swansea, the report will focus on Aberystwyth, 
which operates in Ceredigion only. While the university does 
56 Interviews with Huw Rhys Thomas and Peter Howells, 24 May 2018, and Charlotte Priddy, 25 May 2018.
57 FUW. No date. Welsh farming at glance.
58 Interview with Charlotte Priddy, 25 May 2018.
59 FUW 2014 survey data provided by Charlotte Priddy, 25 May 2018.
60 Interviews with Huw Rhys Thomas and Peter Howells, 24 May 2018.
61 Aberystwyth University. 2017. Aberystwyth named University of the Year for Teaching Quality. 22 September. Available at: https://www.aber.ac.uk/en/news/
archive/2017/09/title-206783-en.html.
62 Aberystwyth University. 2018. League table climb continues for Aberystwyth University. 29 May. Available at: https://www.aber.ac.uk/en/news/archive/2018/05/title-
213606-en.html.
63 Aberystwyth University. 2014. Innovation and Enterprise Campus secures £20m funding. 15 December. Available at: https://www.aber.ac.uk/en/news/
archive/2014/12/title-161032-en.html.
64 Betteley C. 2017. Up to 150 university jobs may be at risk, says union. Cambrian News. 17 May. Available at: http://www.cambrian-news.co.uk/article.
cfm?id=114457&headline=Up%20to%20150%20university%20jobs%20may%20be%20at%20risk,%20says%20union&sectionIs=news&searchyear=2017. 
65 Betteley C. 2018. 100 jobs under threat due to university cuts. Cambrian News. 4 April. Available at: http://www.cambrian-news.co.uk/article.
cfm?id=120016&headline=100%20jobs%20under%20threat%20due%20to%20university%20cuts&sectionIs=news&searchyear=2018.
66 Aberystwyth University. 2017b. Financial statements for the year ending 31 July Available at: https://www.aber.ac.uk/en/media/departmental/finance/pdf/2016-17-
Financial-Accounts-(Eng).pdf, 4. 
not face as complex risks stemming from Brexit as it is the 
case with agriculture, the process of leaving the EU threatens 
to undermine its business model, which heavily relies on the 
recruitment of students from Central and Eastern Europe.
Aberystwyth currently has a student population of around 
8,500, which accounts for nearly a third of the town’s residents 
during term time. It enjoyed much success lately and was 
named University of the Year for Teaching Quality in the 
Times Good University Guide 2018.61 It was also the highest 
climber in The Guardian University Guide 2019.62 Major capital 
projects were recently completed on its main campus, notably 
the Visualisation Centre for which it had secured EU funding. 
Professor John Grattan, the University’s Pro Vice-Chancellor 
for Student Experience and International at the time of 
interview, confirms that contracts have been signed for the 
new Innovation and Enterprise Campus. While the project is 
financed with EU funding,63 it will not be directly affected by the 
UK’s withdrawal. 
However, the last few years have been somewhat turbulent for 
the University, as it reduced spending to offset falling income. 
In 2017, a two-year plan to save £11.4 million was announced, 
with threats to around 150 jobs.64 This was followed up in 2018 
with an announcement that seventeen senior management 
and support jobs would be lost, including the reduction of the 
number of pro vice chancellors from four to two, in a bid to 
save £300,000.65 
Grattan confirms this plan to reduce expenditure is underway. 
But despite the fact that the university has found itself in 
this financial turmoil owing to multiple factors, currently he 
identifies Brexit as the single key challenge that may upset 
efforts to balance the finances. It appears Aberystwyth is more 
vulnerable to Brexit than many others in the sector, precisely 
because Brexit compounds other systemic risks faced by 
the university. Its Financial Statements for the year ending 
31 July 2017 show that the key single source of its income 
are tuition fees, which account for 46%, followed by research 
grants and contracts at 17% and funding grants at 10%.66 The 
same report identifies the changes to student fees, and the 
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opening of the gap in the fees cap between England and Wales 
as a key risk.67 This is because while English universities were 
allowed to increase the fees to £9,250 per year, the Welsh 
Government decided to keep the fees capped at £9,000.68 This 
puts a squeeze on the university as it is not allowed to raise 
the fees in line with inflation on the one hand, and keeps losing 
students on the other. The latter process partly results from the 
tripling of tuition fees in 2010, as research has shown students 
are likely to now choose universities closer to home. This 
disadvantages Aberystwyth because, as John Grattan puts it, 
they ‘have no urban hinterland to recruit from’.69 
The university’s Financial Statements identify key risks for 
the university in terms of student recruitment and retention, 
financial sustainability and reputation; the latter is largely related 
to its position in league tables, which historically dropped, but 
recently there has been significant improvement across all 
major university rankings. Reputation aside, these areas of 
concern can be significantly impacted by the UK’s withdrawal 
from the EU. Therefore, the report states that the ‘uncertainties 
generated by Brexit further exacerbate the position of the 
University as it is likely to substantially impact the number of 
EU students wanting to study in the UK. The referendum result 
also creates uncertainty around research funding.’70 Grattan 
contextualises this further and states the impact of Brexit on 
student recruitment is paramount given that:
• Around 15% of all students at Aberystwyth are from EU27 
countries. 
• Over the years, the university has actively recruited EU27 
students and has developed strong ties with recruitment 
agents in Poland and Romania in particular, and it has 
limited fallback options to make up for a significant drop in 
this recruitment stream.
• EU27 recruits are most often dependent on student 
financing.
67 Ibid., 7. 
68 BBC. 2017. Tuition fee rise to £9,295 in Wales scrapped. 18 October. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-politics-41664499.
69 Interview with Professor John Grattan, 25 May 2018.
70 Aberystwyth University. 2017. Financial Statements for the Year ending 31 July 2017. Available at: https://www.aber.ac.uk/en/media/departmental/finance/
pdf/2016-17-Financial-Accounts-(Eng).pdf, 7.
71 BBC. 2016. 100 cancel Aberystwyth University places after Brexit. 15 July. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-36799951.
72 Interviews with Elin Jones AM, 25 May 2018; and Alun Williams, 24 May 2018.
Therefore, the future recruitment and retention of EU students 
will depend on three key variables which are currently uncertain:
• the immigration policy for EU27 citizens after Brexit;
• the status of EU27 citizens with regards to tuition fees 
(i.e. whether they would be charged home or much higher 
international fees);
• the status of EU27 citizens with regards to student finance 
(i.e. whether they would be able to access student loans and 
grants on the current terms, or not).
In July 2016, shortly after the referendum, Grattan publicly 
highlighted that 100 prospective EU27 students withdrew 
their applications to Aberystwyth.71 While he says this does 
not translate into a significant reduction in recruitment and 
retention as of May 2018, this is because the university has 
worked with its partners to reassure current and prospective 
recruits from EU27 countries. However, future recruitment 
strongly depends of the Brexit settlement for higher education.
Should the university’s current financial problems be 
exacerbated by the effects of Brexit, where the drop in EU27 
students is the primary risk and the loss of research funding 
a secondary one, the impact on the town and its hinterland 
would be considerable. While Aberystwyth recruits globally 
for academic roles, many local residents work in support 
roles or are employed in the university’s extensive supply 
chains. Further, some of the graduates find employment 
within the university and remain in town, which has a positive 
demographic impact given the outflow of young people from 
Ceredigion in general. Finally, the university’s arts and wellbeing 
facilities are open to all residents. While there is an element of 
economic calculation here – these facilities are subsidised by 
the university, but the university also relies on them to attract 
students – the town would be culturally poorer should they 
be lost through cost-saving measures. This assessment is 
backed up by the university itself, as well as local politicians 
representing Aberystwyth in the County Council and the Welsh 
Assembly.72
As these findings show, Ceredigion’s exposure to Brexit is 
considerable and both education and agricultural experts 
identify it as the key risk at the moment. These effects would 
be economic as well as, perhaps less directly, cultural. The last 
section of this report, therefore, elaborates on the kind of Brexit 
that would minimise the above impacts.  
Tuition fees 
generate
46%
of Aberystwyth 
University’s income
£
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Challenges and opportunities
The above analysis shows that Brexit presents a high degree of risks to 
Ceredigion’s economy and society. Leaving the EU may significantly disrupt 
its key industries while offering very few opportunities, as shown using the 
examples of agriculture and higher education.
Brexit opportunities appear to be elusive and include the 
possibility of lighter regulation for the agricultural sector, and 
of new export markets opening up if favourable trade deals 
are negotiated after the UK departs the EU. Further, Brexit 
also poses a serious challenge to Welsh identity, and so there 
is strong support for remaining in the EU amongst Welsh 
nationalists.
However, interviews with local experts also outline the contours 
of a Brexit scenario that would allow Ceredigion to mitigate 
against key risks brought by leaving the EU. Viewed from 
Ceredigion, such positive Brexit outcomes would include:
• remaining within the single market and customs union in 
order to retain market access and regulatory frameworks, 
especially for its agricultural imports and exports;
• retaining access to home fees and tuition and maintenance 
funding for EU27 students whose recruitment is 
fundamental to Aberystwyth University’s financial health;
• replacing CAP subsidies with a distribution formula 
mirroring payments from its first and second pillar, and not 
allocated according to the Barnett formula as that would 
generate a funding gap of £133 million per year in farming 
alone;
• relaxing some of the agricultural regulation to allow more 
flexibility in areas where this does not elevate environmental 
and epidemiological risks;
• matching structural support for Wales by the national 
government on a pound-for-pound basis;
73 Awan-Scully R. 2018. Devolutionist unionist? Brexit won’t ease the complexities of Welsh politics. LSE Brexit Blog. 1 June. Available at: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/
brexit/2018/06/01/devolutionist-unionist-brexit-wont-ease-the-complexities-of-welsh-politics/. 
74 Wyn Jones R. 2016. Why did Wales shoot itself in the foot in this referendum? The Guardian. 27 June. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2016/jun/27/wales-referendum-remain-leave-vote-uk-eu-membership.
• introducing further protections and support for minority 
rights and languages, as well as devolved and local 
governments;
• developing a vision of responsible and inclusive politics 
at the level of devolved government in Wales, and local 
government in Ceredigion;
• advancing a diversified development strategy aimed 
at addressing the current economic and demographic 
challenges in Ceredigion, and related cultural tensions 
which, while at risk of being compounded by Brexit impact, 
do not stem from it.
Studying the impact of Brexit in Ceredigion is important for two 
reasons: first, it makes somewhat abstract concerns about 
trade and sovereignty more immediate and relatable, showing 
how they cascade all the way down to everyday lives. But 
secondly, it also shows that the external dimension of Brexit 
– that is, the withdrawal from and the future relationship with 
the EU – overshadows equally important internal dimensions 
of Brexit,73 such as the question about economic development, 
identity politics and the future of the devolution and localism 
agendas of the UK government. Most likely, the next few years 
will shape the country’s future economic policy and governance 
practices. They can bring politics of resentment, or politics of 
hope.74 In order to articulate the latter, local impacts of Brexit 
have to be adequately scrutinised and debated.
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Appendix
Local Authority Data source Barnet Ceredigion Mansfield Pendle Southampton Country (countries included)
Electorate in Brexit referendum Electoral Commission 223467 53400 77624 64534 158171 46500001
United 
Kingdom
Number of valid votes in Brexit 
referendum
Electoral 
Commission 161033 39742 56344 45335 107665 33551983
United 
Kingdom
Percentage voting remain in Brexit 
referendum
Electoral 
Commission 62.2% 54.6% 29.1% 36.9% 46.2% 48.1%
United 
Kingdom
Percentage voting leave in Brexit 
referendum
Electoral 
Commission 37.8% 45.4% 70.9% 63.2% 53.8% 51.9%
United 
Kingdom
CEP estimate for soft Brexit effect 
(% of GVA) CEP -1.5% -1.2% -1.4% -1.2% -1.2% -1.3%
United 
Kingdom
CEP estimate for hard Brexit effect 
(% of GVA) CEP -2.2% -1.5% -2.0% -1.4% -1.9% -2.7%
United 
Kingdom
Percentage of live births to mothers 
not born in the UK ONS 58.7% 11.1% 17.1% 28.9% 34.8% 26.9%
United 
Kingdom
Percentage non-British ONS 20.8% 4.0% 7.6% 6.7% 19.7% 9.3% United Kingdom
Percentage non UK born ONS 39.0% 6.7% 8.6% 8.9% 22.9% 14.1% United Kingdom
Percentage born in UK, 2011 2011 Census 61.1% 94.0% 94.4% 89.1% 82.4% 86.6% England and Wales
Percentage born in other EU 
countries, 2011 2011 Census 10.4% 2.6% 3.5% 2.3% 6.7% 4.3%
England and 
Wales
Percentage white UK born APS 45.5% 92.5% 86.8% 80.4% 74.8% 79.7% United Kingdom
Percentage white not UK born APS 19.4% 4.4% 6.2% 4.7% 11.8% 6.8% United Kingdom
Percentage ethnic minority UK born APS 17.2% 0.9% 2.0% 6.4% 3.8% 6.5% United Kingdom
Percentage ethnic minority not UK born APS 18.0% 2.3% 5.0% 8.5% 9.6% 7.0% United Kingdom
Employment share: Agriculture, 
forestry & fishing BRES 0.0% 1.7% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 1.6% Great Britain
Employment share: Mining, 
quarrying & utilities BRES 0.2% 0.8% 0.7% 0.7% 0.5% 1.2% Great Britain
Employment share: Manufacturing BRES 2.3% 4.2% 9.8% 28.1% 3.4% 7.9% Great Britain
Employment share: Construction BRES 6.1% 5.8% 7.3% 4.7% 3.0% 4.7% Great Britain
Employment share: Motor trades BRES 1.3% 1.7% 2.4% 1.9% 1.7% 1.8% Great Britain
Employment share: Wholesale BRES 3.0% 2.0% 4.3% 3.9% 2.6% 3.9% Great Britain
Employment share: Retail BRES 11.4% 10.0% 12.2% 10.9% 9.4% 9.5% Great Britain
Employment share: 
Transport & storage (inc postal) BRES 3.0% 2.3% 2.2% 2.2% 6.8% 4.8% Great Britain
Employment share: 
Accommodation & food services BRES 6.8% 13.3% 6.1% 7.0% 6.8% 7.4% Great Britain
Employment share: 
Information & communication BRES 4.5% 1.3% 1.5% 3.9% 6.0% 4.1% Great Britain
Employment share: 
Financial & insurance BRES 1.9% 0.8% 1.5% 1.4% 3.0% 3.5% Great Britain
Employment share: Property BRES 4.5% 1.5% 0.9% 1.4% 1.5% 1.7% Great Britain
Employment share: 
Professional, scientific & technical BRES 11.4% 3.3% 4.3% 3.9% 5.1% 8.7% Great Britain
Appendix 1: Sociodemographic/voting/economy
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Local Authority Data source Barnet Ceredigion Mansfield Pendle Southampton Country (countries included)
Employment share: Business 
administration & support services BRES 8.3% 2.0% 12.2% 4.7% 12.0% 8.8% Great Britain
Employment share: Public 
administration & defence BRES 3.4% 6.7% 4.3% 2.5% 4.3% 4.2% Great Britain
Employment share: Education BRES 11.4% 20.0% 8.5% 9.4% 12.0% 8.6% Great Britain
Employment share: Health BRES 15.2% 13.3% 14.6% 10.9% 17.1% 13.0% Great Britain
Employment share: Arts, entertainment, 
recreation & other services
BRES 5.3% 5.0% 4.3% 2.5% 3.8% 4.6% Great Britain
Percentage with NVQ level 4+, 
aged 16-64
APS 54.0% 31.4% 17.5% 21.5% 36.0% 38.4% United 
Kingdom
Percentage with no qualifications, 
aged 16-64
APS 5.5% 7.6% 11.2% 9.1% 7.4% 8.0% United 
Kingdom
Population, 2017 APS 389,700 74,800 105,800 89,700 250,900 65,114,500 United 
Kingdom
Social Mobility Index 
(ranking out of 324)
Social 
Mobility Index
9 Not 
available
315 144 247 Not 
applicable
Not 
applicable
General Election 2015: 
Percentage Conservative
Electoral 
Commission
49.5% 11.0% 28.2% 47.2% 39.7% 36.8% United 
Kingdom
General Election 2015: 
Percentage Labour
Electoral 
Commission
38.4% 9.7% 39.4% 34.9% 19.1% 30.4% United 
Kingdom
General Election 2015: 
Percentage UKIP
Electoral 
Commission
5.5% 10.2% 25.1% 12.2% 12.8% 12.6% United 
Kingdom
General Election 2015: Turnout Electoral 
Commission
68.0% 69.0% 60.9% 68.8% 63.4% 66.4% United 
Kingdom
General Election 2017: Percentage 
Conservative
Electoral 
Commission
47.1% 18.4% 46.6% 49.0% 42.8% 42.4% United 
Kingdom
General Election 2017: Percentage 
Labour
Electoral 
Commission
45.2% 20.2% 44.5% 46.2% 47.7% 40.0% United 
Kingdom
General Election 2017: Percentage 
UKIP
Electoral 
Commission
0.6% 1.5% 5.3% 0.0% 1.0% 1.8% United 
Kingdom
General Election 2017: Turnout Electoral 
Commission
70.5% 73.3% 64.5% 69.0% 67.1% 68.8% United 
Kingdom
Price level, 2016 
(regional, relative to UK index of 100)
ONS 107.2 98.1 99.6 98.8 101.5 100.0 United 
Kingdom
House price, 2017 
(mean transaction price)
Land Registry £691,914 £224,337 £148,961 £114,441 £268,534 £345,715 England and 
Wales
Notes
Employment by ethnicity data is obtained from Nomis but is not included here due to space constraints
Electoral comission data for the EU referendum is available at https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-subject/elections-and-referendums/past-
elections-and-referendums/eu-referendum/electorate-and-count-information
The Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) paper is available at http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/brexit10.pdf
The ONS migration data is available at: https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/migrationwithintheuk/datasets/
localareamigrationindicatorsunitedkingdom
Data from the Census, Annual Population Survey (APS), and Business Register and Employment Survey (BRES) are available at Noms: https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/
The Social Mobility Index is only available for England
ONS regional price data is available at: https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/inflationandpriceindices/articles/relativeregionalconsumerpricelevelsuk/2016 
House Price data is available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/price-paid-data-downloads
Electoral Comission data for the 2015 and 2017 general elections is available at: https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/our-work/our-research/electoral-data/
electoral-data-files-and-reports
General election voting data is available at the parliamentary constituency level whereas this project focuses on local authorities. We impute local authority level data 
by fitting constituencies into local authorities. For Ceredigion, Mansfield and Pendle, the parliamentary constituency is equivalent to the local authority. Barnet is a 
combination of three parliamentary constituencies, namely: Finchley and Golders Green, Hendon, and Chipping Barnet. For these four local authorities there is no issue in 
obtaining local authority level general election data. Southampton is constructed of two full constituencies - Test and Itchen - and part of the constituency Romsey and 
Southampton North. To obtain general election data for Southampton, we use the population-weighted mean of the general election results for these constituencies. This 
requires us to assume that the voting behaviour of voters in the section of Romsey and Southampton North that is in the local authority Southampton is equivalent to the 
proportion that is outside of Southampton local authority. We believe that this is a reasonable assumption. Further, it only affects a 11.9% of the Southampton population, 
so any induced error is likely to be relatively very small.
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Percentage decrease in local authority 
GVA: Hard Brexit (Dhingra et al. 2017)
Percentage decrease in local authority 
GVA: Soft Brexit (Dhingra et al. 2017)
Appendix 2: Post Brexit percentage decrease in local authority
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